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NORTH DAKOTA’S SEAT BELT DEFENSE:  IT’S TIME FOR 
NORTH DAKOTA TO STATUTORILY ADOPT THE DOCTRINE 
OF AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the context of tort law, the seat belt defense is in its infancy.  The 
purpose of the defense is to allow a defendant in a personal injury claim to 
admit evidence of the plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt.  If the defendant 
can adequately prove a causal relationship between the plaintiff’s failure to 
wear a seat belt and the injuries alleged, the seat belt defense can be an 
effective tool to reduce or wholly defeat a plaintiff’s recovery for damages.  
This article argues the need for North Dakota to adopt the doctrine of 
avoidable consequences with regard to the seat belt defense.  The adoption 
of this approach is the most equitable alternative to the seat belt defense.  
Part II discusses an overview of comparative negligence theories and its 
relationship to the seat belt defense’s origins.  The three basic approaches to 
the admissibility of the seat belt defense are discussed in Part III:  
inadmissible, admissible only to mitigate damages (doctrine of avoidable 
consequences), or admissible to prove comparative negligence.  Part IV of 
the article outlines the arguments for and against the adoption of the 
doctrine of avoidable consequences and provides a proposal for North 
Dakota to statutorily adopt the doctrine of avoidable consequences as it 
pertains to the seat belt defense.  Lastly, Part V restates the need for a 
change in North Dakota’s current approach to the seat belt defense. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Rosemary Karczmit was fatally injured after her car hit a patch of ice, 
left the roadway, and collided with a telephone post.1  Her husband brought 
a wrongful death action against the State of New York, alleging the State’s 
failure to maintain proper drains and guide rails were the proximate causes 
of Rosemary’s death.2  In response, the State asserted Rosemary’s injuries, 
which resulted in her death, would not have been caused but-for her failure 
to wear a seat belt at the time of the accident.3  The court rendered a judg-
ment in favor of Karczmit, but held Rosemary fifty percent at fault for 
causing the accident.4  The court additionally held Rosemary failed to 
mitigate her damages by failing to wear a seat belt.5  Therefore, Karczmit’s 
judgment was reduced by an additional twenty-five percent.6 
Under North Dakota’s current law, Karczmit’s recovery would have 
been substantially different.7  Because Rosemary was fifty percent at fault 
for causing the accident and her failure to wear a seat belt accounted for an 
additional twenty-five percent of her damages, under North Dakota law, she 
would have been deemed seventy-five percent at fault.8  Consequently, 
Karczmit’s claim would have been completely barred under comparative 
negligence, and he would have recovered nothing in the wrongful death 
claim.9 
The outcome of Karczmit was wholly dependent on how New York 
admitted evidence of seat belt nonuse in personal injury claims.10  The 
admissibility of such evidence is known as the seat belt defense.11  In the 
context of tort law, the seat belt defense is in its infancy.12  Rooted in the 
adoption of comparative negligence, the seat belt defense predominantly 
 
1. Karczmit v. State, 588 N.Y.S.2d 963, 964 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1992). 
2. Id.  Karczmit alleged the patch of ice was caused by a defective drainage system and the 
car failed to stay on the road because of an inadequate guardrail system.  Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 972. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. See discussion infra Part III.C (explaining North Dakota recognizes accident-causing fault 
and injury-causing fault as the same thing). 
8. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (2010) (combining accident-causing and 
injury-causing fault). 
9. See generally id. (barring claims where the plaintiff’s fault is as great as, or is greater than, 
the defendant’s fault). 
10. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1229-c(8) (Consol. 1992) (failing to wear a seat belt is 
admissible to mitigate a plaintiff’s damages). 
11. Dean Joseph Miller, Comment, The Seat Belt Defense Under Comparative Negligence, 
12 IDAHO L. REV. 59, 59 n.1 (1975). 
12. Id. at 59. 
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came to the forefront of tort issues within the last four decades.13  Although 
most states have statutory enactments or judicial fiats concerning the admis-
sibility of seat belt evidence, North Dakota has an unsettled history with 
regard to the seat belt defense’s admissibility.14 
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the need for North Dakota 
to statutorily adopt the doctrine of avoidable consequences as it pertains to 
the seat belt defense.  Part II discusses an overview of comparative negli-
gence and its relationship to the seat belt defense’s origins.15  The three 
basic approaches to the admissibility of the seat belt defense are discussed 
in Part III:  inadmissible, admissible only to mitigate damages (doctrine of 
avoidable consequences), or admissible to prove comparative negligence.16  
Part IV of the article outlines the arguments for and against the adoption of 
the doctrine of avoidable consequences and provides a proposal for North 
Dakota to statutorily adopt the doctrine for the seat belt defense.17  Lastly, 
Part V restates the need for a change in North Dakota’s current approach to 
the seat belt defense.18 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF NEGLIGENCE THEORIES AND THEIR 
RELATIONSHIP TO THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE 
The theory that contributory negligence completely bars a plaintiff’s 
recovery in negligence actions arose in England in the early nineteenth 
century.19  The United States first adjudicated the theory in 1824.20  
Contributory negligence remained in effect for over a century but was 
slowly phased out in favor of comparative fault.21  During the transition, the 
issue of the seat belt defense came to the forefront of tort law.22  This 
section will first discuss the United States’ shift from contributory 
 
13. Id. 
14. See discussion infra Parts III.A-D (discussing the three variations of admitting seat belt 
evidence and North Dakota’s approach to the defense). 
15. See discussion infra Part II. 
16. See discussion infra Part III. 
17. See discussion infra Part IV. 
18. See discussion infra Part V. 
19. David C. Sobelsohn, Comparing Fault, 60 IND. L.J. 413, 413 (1985). 
20. Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621, 624 (1824) (holding a plaintiff’s failure to 
exercise ordinary care should preclude the plaintiff from recovering damages); Sobelsohn, supra 
note 19, at 413. 
21.  Sobelsohn, supra note 19, at 414.  “Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the 
plaintiff . . . which is a legally contributing cause . . . [to] the plaintiff’s harm.”  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965).  Comparative fault requires the fact finder to compare each 
party’s negligence and reduce the plaintiff’s damages based on the comparison.  MARSHALL S. 
SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW 171 (2003). 
22. David A. Westenberg, Buckle Up or Pay: The Emerging Safety Belt Defense, 20 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 867, 870 (1986). 
          
2011] NOTE 143 
negligence to comparative negligence and its impact on personal injury 
litigation.23  Then, this section will discuss the origins of the seat belt 
defense in light of the negligence doctrines.24  Lastly, the relationship 
between the negligence theories and the seat belt defense will be 
analyzed.25 
A. SHIFT FROM CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 
Comparative negligence is a relatively new concept in American tort 
law.26  It was not until the 1970s when states began to steer away from 
contributory negligence to the more lenient theory of comparative negli-
gence.27  The shift was in response to the apparent lack of justification for 
contributory negligence and the harshness of completely barring recovery 
for the plaintiff, no matter how slight the plaintiff’s “lack of ordinary care” 
may be.28 
There are three general forms of comparative negligence:  “pure” 
comparative negligence and two forms of “modified” comparative 
negligence.29  “Pure” comparative negligence is the simplest form of com-
parative negligence, which compensates a plaintiff for all harm attributable 
to the tortfeasor, but reduces the plaintiff’s damages in proportion to his/her 
own negligence.30  “Pure” comparative negligence will not bar recovery 
unless the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages is wholly attributable 
to the plaintiff.31  Congress adopted the “pure” form of comparative 
negligence with the enactment of the Federal Employers Liability Act in 
1908.32  Two years later, Mississippi became the first state to statutorily 
adopt the theory of pure comparative negligence for all negligence cases.33  
Now, thirteen states throughout the United States have statutorily or judi-
cially adopted the “pure” form of comparative negligence.34 
 
23. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
24. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
25. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
26. Miller, supra note 11, at 62. 
27. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 471 (5th ed. 1984). 
28. Miller, supra note 11, at 59.  A plaintiff’s claim was barred if he/she was found to be one 
percent or more at fault.  Id. 
29. KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, at 471. 
30. Id. If the plaintiff is awarded a $100,000.00 judgment but is eighty-five percent at fault, 
he can only recover $15,000.00. 
31. 21 AM. JUR. Trials § 3 (1974). 
32. Id. § 4. 
33. Id. 
34. Arthur Best, Impediments to Reasonable Tort Reform: Lessons from the Adoption of 
Comparative Negligence, 40 IND. L. REV. 1, 17, app. (2007); see also ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.060 
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The second and third types of comparative negligence are considered 
“modified” forms of comparative negligence.35  The first approach, or the 
“equal fault bar” approach, allows a plaintiff to recover as long as his/her 
negligence is less than that of the defendant.36  Wisconsin and Arkansas 
were the first states to adopt this approach to comparative negligence.37  
The other “modified” form of comparative negligence is the “greater fault 
bar,” which allows the plaintiff to recover damages so long as his/her fault 
does not exceed that of the defendant.38  In 1969, New Hampshire became 
the first state to adopt the “greater fault bar” form of modified comparative 
negligence.39 
B. THE ORIGINS OF THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE 
As the American court systems shifted from contributory negligence to 
comparative negligence, some state legislatures implemented statutes man-
dating the installation of seat belts in all newly modeled automobiles.40  In 
conjunction with the requirement to install seat belts, five states judicially 
adopted the seat belt defense in civil litigation cases.41  In the 1966 Sams v. 
 
(2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2505 (LexisNexis 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572o 
(West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 
(LexisNexis 2005); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 
600.2957(1) (LexisNexis 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.765 
(West 2008); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411 (Consol. 2001); R.I. GEN LAWS § 9-20-4 (1997); Li v. Yellow 
Cab, Co. 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1242 (N.M. 1981). 
35. Best, supra note 34, at 17. 
36. Id.  A plaintiff will recover if he/she is found to be forty-nine percent or less at fault for 
the damages.  Id. 
37. AM. JUR., supra note 31, § 3.  Several other states followed Wisconsin and Arkansas 
thereafter.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1985); 735 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1116 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-2-6 (LexisNexis 2008); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3 (West 1998); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (LexisNexis 2000); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (2009); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 41.141 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d (LexisNexis 2009); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.33 (LexisNexis 2010); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18.470 (2003); 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-15 (2005); TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (West 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (2002); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (West 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 2006); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 1-1-109 (2011). 
38. AM. JUR., supra note 31, § 3.  The plaintiff will recover if he/she is fifty percent or less at 
fault than the defendant.  Id. 
39. See id. § 4.  Several states followed New Hampshire’s example.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 
16-64-122 (Supp. 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-11-7 
(2000); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-801 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (Supp. 2010); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78B-5-818 (LexisNexis 2008); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tenn. 1992); Bradley v. 
Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (W. Va. 1979). 
40. Westenberg, supra note 22, at 874. 
41. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 42-56. 
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Sams42 case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina became the first court to 
recognize the merits of the seat belt defense.43  The basis for admitting evi-
dence of seat belt nonuse rested on the belief that the plaintiff’s failure to 
wear his seat belt “amounted to a failure to exercise such due care as a 
person of ordinary reason and prudence would have exercised under the 
same circumstances, and that such failure constituted a contributing 
proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.”44 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin faced the question of the admis-
sibility of seat belt nonuse a year later in Bentzler v. Braun.45  Bentzler was 
injured in a rear-end collision when she was thrown from her seat and 
pinned in the wreckage.46  At the time of the accident, Benztler was asleep 
and not wearing her seat belt.47  The trial court determined Bentzler’s 
failure to wear an available seat belt was negligent, but did not cause her 
injuries.48  On appeal, Braun argued Bentzler’s negligence was the cause of 
her injuries and the jury should have been given a special verdict form 
regarding Bentzler’s negligence by failing to use a seat belt.49  Wisconsin’s 
supreme court determined the failure to use an available seat belt could not 
be negligence per se without a statute mandating the use of seat belts, but 
rather invoked the common law standard of ordinary care.50  Therefore, if 
evidence indicated a causal relationship between the plaintiff’s failure to 
use a seat belt and his/her injuries, a jury instruction would be proper and 
necessary.51  One year later, the Appellate Court of Illinois adopted the 
causal relationship standard in Mount v. McClellan.52 
The most prominent adoption of the seat belt defense came in Spier v. 
Barker,53 which is now regarded as the modern version of the defense.54  
The New York Court of Appeals determined “the plaintiff’s nonuse of an 
available seat belt should be strictly limited to the jury’s determination of 
 
42. 148 S.E.2d 154 (S.C. 1966). 
43. Sams, 148 S.E.2d at 155. 
44. Id.  The California Court of Appeals adopted the same standard in Truman v. Vargas, 80 
Cal. Rptr. 373 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1969). 
45. 149 N.W.2d 626 (Wis. 1967). 
46. Bentzler, 149 N.W.2d at 630. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 638. 
50. Id. at 639. 
51. Id. at 640. 
52. 234 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).  The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed Mount 
seventeen years later.  Clarkson v. Wright, 483 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ill. 1985) (rejecting the seat belt 
defense). 
53. 323 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 1974). 
54. Westenberg, supra note 22, at 874. 
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the plaintiff’s damages and should not be considered by the triers of fact in 
resolving the issue of liability.”55  However, the court further concluded the 
issue of mitigating damages should only be given to the jury after the defen-
dant demonstrates, by “competent evidence,” a causal relationship between 
the injuries, or damages, sustained and the plaintiff’s failure to use a seat 
belt.56 
As courts began adopting the seat belt defense as an affirmative 
defense in civil negligence cases, state legislatures began pushing for laws 
mandating seat belt use.57  The push for such laws derived from the 
increased social and economic loss incurred by auto accidents.58  In 
response to demands, Congress passed the Federal Aid Highway Act of 
1973, which allowed Congress to increase state highway funds by twenty-
five percent if states passed mandatory seat belt use laws.59  Additionally, 
on July 17, 1984, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) enacted Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208, 
requiring the mandatory installation of seat belts in all vehicles.60 
In addition to requiring the installation of seat belts, the federal 
standard required a provision suggesting the admissibility of seat belt 
evidence.61  The provision stated, in relevant part, any plaintiff violating the 
seat belt requirement would mitigate his/her damages if the plaintiff sought 
compensation for injuries arising from the accident.62  Although states 
began mandating the installation of seat belts, a majority of states failed to 
adopt the “mitigation” provision.63  However, the minority of states 
adopting the “mitigation” provision did so with substantial modifications.64 
 
55. Spier, 323 N.E.2d at 167. 
56. Id. 
57. Michael B. Gallub, Note, A Compromise Between Mitigation and Comparative Fault?: A 
Critical Assessment of the Seat Belt Controversy and a Proposal for Reform, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
319, 319 (1986). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 334-35 n.79 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S4.1.5.2(c)(2) (1985)). 
61. Id. 
62. See id.  “Mitigate” was to refer to either the mitigating damages approach or any other 
approach which would reduce the plaintiff’s award.  Id. at 335 n.80.  The NHTSA’s approach 
included comparative fault.  Id. 
63. Id. 
64. See discussion infra Parts III.B-C. 
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C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEGLIGENCE THEORIES  
AND THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE 
The strength of the seat belt defense correlates with the American court 
system’s adoption of comparative negligence.65  Prior to the adoption of 
comparative negligence, the seat belt defense had been unanimously 
rejected.66  Contributory negligence had the ability to bar a claim if the 
plaintiff was one percent at fault, which made courts unwilling to com-
pletely bar a plaintiff’s recovery for failing to wear a seat belt.67  Courts 
have unanimously rejected the assertion that failing to wear a mandatory 
seat belt is negligence per se because it would also completely bar a 
plaintiff’s recovery.68 
However, under the newly accepted comparative negligence laws, the 
failure to wear a seat belt may or may not completely bar a plaintiff’s 
recovery.69  Under the “pure” form of comparative negligence, a plaintiff’s 
damages can be reduced up to ninety-nine percent.70  Nevertheless, under 
either form of “modified” comparative negligence, there is a possibility the 
plaintiff’s claim will be completely barred because of his/her failure to wear 
a seat belt.71 
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE 
There are three distinct ways in which a state can admit the seat belt 
defense.72  A majority of states have determined seat belt evidence is not 
admissible for any purpose in the adjudication process of civil litigation 
 
65. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
66. Miller, supra note 11, at 64.  Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the 
District of Columbia still adhere to the principle of contributory negligence and, therefore, do not 
admit evidence of seat belt nonuse. See Westenberg, supra note 22, at 944, app. D; see also MD. 
CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 22-412.3(h)(1)(i)-(ii) (LexisNexis 2009) (stating evidence in violation of 
the mandatory seat belt law may not be considered for negligence or contributory negligence); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1094(D) (2005) (stating evidence of seat belt nonuse shall not constitute 
negligence and is not admissible); Britton v. Doehring, 242 So. 2d 666, 671 (Ala. 1970) (holding 
seat belt evidence is inadmissible to show contributory negligence on behalf of the plaintiff); 
McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720, 722 (D.C. 1976) (determining seat belt nonuse cannot be 
considered evidence of contributory negligence); Miller v. Miller, 160 S.E.2d 65, 74 (N.C. 1968) 
(holding a plaintiff cannot foreseeably anticipate another’s negligence and, therefore, seat belt 
evidence is generally inadmissible to show contributory negligence). 
67. John A. Hoglund & A. Peter Parsons, Caveat Viator: The Duty to Wear Seat Belts Under 
Comparative Negligence Law, 50 WASH. L. REV. 1, 9 (1974). 
68. Id. 
69. See infra text accompanying notes 70-71. 
70. KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, at 471-72.  Therefore, as long as the plaintiff’s failure to 
wear a seat belt is not the only cause of his/her injuries, the plaintiff will recover. 
71. Id. at 473.  If the plaintiff is found to be fifty or fifty-one percent liable for his/her 
damages, the claim is completely barred.  Id. 
72. See infra text accompanying notes 73-75. 
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claims.73  Another alternative, and perhaps the most diverse alternative, is 
the theory that a plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt is a failure by the 
plaintiff to mitigate his/her damages.74  Lastly, some states allow evidence 
of seat belt nonuse to show comparative fault.75  North Dakota has not 
taken a firm stance on the issue, but is among the minority of states that 
allow evidence of seat belt nonuse to be admitted as evidence of com-
parative negligence.76 
A. EVIDENCE OF SEAT BELT NONUSE IS NOT ADMISSIBLE 
The majority of states do not allow the seat belt defense in any 
fashion.77  Traditionally, states were unwilling to admit seat belt evidence to 
show fault under contributory negligence based on its ability to wholly 
defeat a plaintiff’s claim.78  Scholars believed the shift from contributory 
negligence to comparative fault would lead to the adoption of the seat belt 
defense.79  However, in light of the doctrine of comparative fault, states still 
embrace the defense’s inadmissibility.80  This part of the article will discuss 
states within the Eighth Circuit that do not allow the seat belt defense to be 
admitted in personal injury proceedings.81 
1. Minnesota 
Minnesota is one of two states within the Eighth Circuit and one of 
thirty states within the United States that does not permit the seat belt 
defense to be used in any personal injury claim.82  Minnesota has taken a 
firm stance on applying the seat belt gag rule,83 precluding evidence of seat 
belt nonuse from all personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle 
 
73. Westenberg, supra note 22, at 887-88. 
74. Gallub, supra note 57, at 322-23; see also discussion infra Part III.B. 
75. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
76. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (2010) (combining accident-causing fault and injury-
causing fault for purposes of demonstrating comparative fault). 
77. Westenberg, supra note 22, at 887-88; see also infra Appendix A. 
78. Miller, supra note 11, at 66.  Contributory negligence would bar a plaintiff’s claim if the 
plaintiff was found to be at least one percent at fault.  KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, at 471. 
79. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 67, at 14-15. 
80. See discussion infra Parts III.A.1-2. 
81. See discussion infra Parts III.A.1-2. 
82. See infra Appendix A; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.685(4)(a) (Supp. 2011) (stating 
“proof of the use or failure to use seat belts . . . or proof of the installation or failure of installation 
of seat belts . . . shall not be admissible in evidence in any litigation involving personal injuries or 
property damages resulting from the use or operation of any motor vehicle”). 
83. “Minnesota Statute section 169.685(4)(a) has commonly been referred to as the seat belt 
gag rule.”  Carlson v. Hyundai Motor Co., 164 F.3d 1160, 1161 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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collisions.84  The intent behind disallowing such evidence is to “remove 
from the jury’s consideration the use or nonuse of a seat belt” when 
considering damages.85 
Cressy v. Grassmann86 challenged the constitutionality of the seat belt 
gag rule.  The appellants argued differentiating between defendants, based 
on which traffic law the plaintiff violated, was unconstitutional.87  The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals did not find merit in the argument based on the 
relationship between the accident and its proximate cause.88  The court 
stated violation of the seat belt statute generally does not cause the accident, 
but it rather relates to the extent of damages.89  The court determined 
creating classes of plaintiffs based on those who cause an accident and 
those who failed to mitigate his/her own damages sufficed the different 
treatment prong of the equal protection clause.90  The second and third 
prongs were satisfied if the state’s directive served a particular class of 
people and a legitimate state interest, respectively.91  The court in Cressy 
opined ensuring accident victims were fairly compensated served a 
particular class of people—accident victims.92  Furthermore, providing the 
opportunity for accident victims to recoup losses served a legitimate state 
interest.93  The court in Cressy also opined the enactment of mandatory seat 
belt laws and comparative fault statutes did not repeal the seat belt 
defense.94 
2. South Dakota 
In 1994, South Dakota mandated the use of seat belts for passengers in 
the front seat of a vehicle,95 the same year the legislature adopted the seat 
belt gag rule.96  The gag rule provided, among other things, that the failure 
to use a seat belt may not be used in “any civil litigation on issues of 
 
84. Id. at 1161-62 (failing to use a seat belt or proof of failure to installation a seat belt is 
inadmissible evidence in any suit involving personal injuries arising out of the use of a motor 
vehicle or in crashworthiness claims alleging a defect in the seat belt system). 
85. Lind v. Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
86. 536 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
87. Cressy, 536 N.W.2d at 42 (differentiating between plaintiffs who violated the seat belt 
law and any other traffic violation). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 43. 
95. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-38-1 (2004) (indicating the mandate for use of seat belts). 
96. See id. § 32-38-4. 
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injuries or mitigating damages.”97  The statute further states that failing to 
comply with the mandatory seat belt law does “not constitute contributory 
negligence, comparative negligence, or an assumption of risk.”98 
In 1993, one year prior to the effective date of South Dakota Codified 
Laws section 32-38-4, forbidding the admissibility of seat belt nonuse in 
civil litigation claims, Jeffrey Davis was involved in a two-car accident 
with Susan Knippling.99  As a result of the accident, Davis, who was not 
wearing a seat belt, suffered multiple injuries.100  At trial, the defense was 
allowed to admit evidence of Davis’s seat belt nonuse to show he failed to 
avoid or minimize his damages.101  The court recognized the newly enacted 
section 32-38-4 controlled the issue for future cases, but decided the issue 
for the limited purpose of the case at hand.102 
The South Dakota Supreme Court ruled consistent with the newly 
enacted statute, holding a plaintiff’s failure to wear an available seat belt 
should not be admissible in civil litigation claims.103  The court reasoned 
such admissibility was inconsistent with the traditional view of the miti-
gation doctrine.104  Furthermore, the court desired to stay in line with a 
majority of states judicially declining to admit seat belt nonuse to show a 
plaintiff’s failure to mitigate his/her damages.105 
B. EVIDENCE OF SEAT BELT NONUSE IS ADMISSIBLE  
TO MITIGATE DAMAGES 
There are a number of states that have adopted an alternative approach 
to admitting the seat belt defense.106  These states allow the seat belt 
defense to be admitted only to show the plaintiff failed to mitigate his/her 
damages.107  The theory is known as the doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences.108  There are a variety of ways in which states apply the 
 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Davis v. Knippling, 576 N.W.2d 525, 526, 528 (S.D. 1998). 
100. Id. at 526. 
101. Id. at 528. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 529. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Gallub, supra note 57, at 322-23. 
107. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 67, at 18-19.  The jury is instructed to determine the 
percentage of damages which were attributable to the plaintiff’s negligence.  Id. at 19 n.69.  After 
allocation of comparative fault has been established, the plaintiff’s damages are then reduced by a 
percentage of “mitigating damages.”  Id. at 19. 
108. Miller, supra note 11, at 70. 
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doctrine.109  However, it is consistent among states allowing the seat belt 
defense that a causal relationship must be shown between the failure to 
wear a seat belt and the resulting injuries.110  This part of the article 
discusses two approaches to the doctrine of avoidable consequences.111 
1. Iowa, Nebraska, and Missouri 
Three states within the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Iowa, 
Nebraska, and Missouri, are among the minority of states that allow the seat 
belt defense for purposes of demonstrating the plaintiff’s failure to mitigate 
his/her damages.112  States that have adopted the doctrine of avoidable con-
sequences approach acknowledge the seat belt defense’s applicability, but 
limit its scope by placing a percentage cap on the extent to which the 
plaintiff’s recovery may be reduced.113  Therefore, after the fact finder has 
determined the allocation of fault between the parties, the fact finder then 
reduces the plaintiff’s damage recovery by the percentage attributed to the 
failure to wear a seat belt.114  The additional reduction is not factored into 
the comparative fault analysis for purposes of recovery.115 
Throughout the United States, the percentage cap is held between no 
more than a one percent reduction up to no more than a fifteen percent 
reduction.116  Iowa and Nebraska are among several states that allow the 
seat belt defense to attribute up to five percent for the plaintiff’s failure to 
mitigate damages.117  However, Missouri is the most lenient state, capping 
the reduction at no more than one percent.118 
 
109. See Jesse N. Bomer, Comment, The Seatbelt Defense: A Doctrine Based in Common 
Sense, 38 TULSA L. REV. 405, 420-24 (2002). 
110. Gallub, supra note 57, at 322-23.  “[T]he defendant bears the burden of proving, by use 
of expert testimony, which injuries, if any, the plaintiff could have avoided through use of  a 
seatbelt.”  Id. at 322. 
111. Alternative approaches not discussed include the reduction for pain and suffering only.  
See infra appendix A (referencing Colorado’s statute allowing reduction for pain and suffering). 
112. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445(4)(b) (West 1997 & Supp. 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
307.178(4) (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-6,273 (2004). 
113. Bomer, supra note 109, at 422. 
114. KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, at 345. 
115. For example, if a person is forty-five percent at fault and his failure to wear a seat belt 
attributes to five percent of his injuries, he can still recover under a modified comparative fault 
structure because the two percentages are independent of one another and are applied 
consecutively, not concurrently. 
116. Bomer, supra note 109, at 422-23; see infra Appendix A. 
117. IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445(4); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-6,273. 
118. MO. ANN. STAT. § 307.178(4) (West 2009). 
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2. New York 
Although New York is the only state that applies an unrestricted miti-
gating damages approach, the unrestricted mitigation approach is said to be 
the modern trend for the seat belt defense.119  Prior to the codification of the 
mitigation of damages approach, the New York Court of Appeals faced the 
question of how to admit seat belt use evidence in a civil litigation claim.120  
The court recognized three different approaches to admitting the seat belt 
defense.121  The first approach held the plaintiff’s failure to use a seat belt 
as negligence per se.122  However, the court rejected the approach on the 
basis that New York did not require an automobile occupant to use an avail-
able seat belt at the time the accident occurred.123 
The court also rejected the second approach:  the doctrine of contri-
butory negligence.124  The theory of contributory negligence is only 
applicable “if the plaintiff’s failure to exercise due care causes, in whole or 
in part, the accident,” and the court determined failing to use a seat belt 
rarely, if ever, causes an accident.125  The New York Court of Appeals, 
therefore, adopted a modification of the third approach:  the plaintiff cannot 
recover for injuries sustained if the plaintiff acted with disregard to his/her 
best interest.126 
The Spier court held the doctrine of avoidable consequences to be the 
most equitable approach to the seat belt defense.127  Although wearing a 
seat belt is a pre-accident obligation and the doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences generally deals with post-accident conduct, the act of fastening a 
seat belt is “an unusual and ordinarily unavailable” means by which a 
plaintiff can minimize his/her damages prior to the accident.128  New York 
codified the doctrine of avoidable consequences approach following the 
decision in Spier.129 
 
 
119. Westenberg, supra note 22, at 874; see also Bomer, supra note 109, at 421. 
120. Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164, 165-66 (N.Y. 1974). 
121. Id. at 167. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 167-68. 
125. Id. at 168.  The court felt it improper to impose liability on a plaintiff for all of his/her 
injuries, if the seat belt would have prevented only some or none of the injuries.  Id. 
126. Id. at 167. 
127. Id. at 168. 
128. Id. 
129. Bomer, supra note 109, at 412.  The avoidable consequences approach allows the jury 
to reduce a plaintiff’s damage recovery by any amount without barring the plaintiff’s claim.  
Spier, 332 N.E.2d at 167. 
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C. EVIDENCE OF SEAT BELT NONUSE IS ADMISSIBLE TO 
PROVE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 
A minority of states allow the seat belt defense to show comparative 
fault.130  These jurisdictions generally acknowledge failing to wear a seat 
belt in violation of mandatory seat belt laws is not negligence per se, but 
they recognize the defense’s ability to show comparative fault.131  This 
section discusses the comparative fault approach to the seat belt defense 
throughout the United States.132 
1. Florida 
Florida is one of three states whose legislature has adopted the seat belt 
defense as a means for showing comparative fault.133  In 1986, Florida 
passed the Florida Safety Belt Law, mandating the use of seat belts in the 
front seat of automobiles.134  In addition to mandating the use of seat belts, 
the provision provided that a violation of the mandatory seat belt law was 
not prima facie evidence of negligence or negligence per se.135  However, 
the statutory language created ambiguity in determining whether seat belt 
use should be considered for purposes of contributory negligence or miti-
gating damages.136  Therefore, in 1990, the Florida Legislature amended the 
statute to explicitly state a violation of the mandatory seat belt statute may 
be considered as comparative negligence, not negligence, negligence per se, 
or in consideration for mitigation of damages.137  The change was adopted 
to create consistency and clarity within the judicial system.138 
 
130. See infra appendix A; see also CAL. VEH. CODE § 27315(i) (Deering Supp. 2011); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 316.614(10) (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 257.710e(7) (LexisNexis 
2010) (reducing recovery of damages only up to five percent); Law v. Superior Court, 755 P.2d 
1135, 1145 (Ariz. 1988); Wemyss v. Coleman, 729 S.W.2d 174, 179 (Ky. 1987); Dunn v. Durso, 
530 A.2d 387, 397 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986); Day v. Gen. Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349, 
357 (N.D. 1984).  North Dakota is the only other state within the Eighth Circuit allowing evidence 
of seat belt nonuse to be used for comparative fault.  See infra Appendix A. 
131. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
132. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
133. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.614(10); see also CAL. VEH. CODE § 27315(i); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS SERV. § 257.710e(7). 
134. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.614 (stating the driver of the vehicle and any front seat 
passenger over the age of sixteen must wear a seat belt); Ridley v. Safety Kleen Corp., 693 So. 2d 
934, 940 (Fla. 1996). 
135. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.614. 
136. Ridley, 693 So. 2d at 940. 
137. Id. at 940-41. 
138. Id. at 941. 
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2. New Jersey 
Although a few states have legislatively adopted the seat belt defense 
as a means for showing comparative fault, other states have judicially 
adopted the approach.139  In Dunn v. Durso,140 the Superior Court of New 
Jersey recognized a plaintiff’s “common-law duty to wear an available seat 
belt.”141  Although New Jersey did not mandate the use of seat belts at the 
time, the court opined a plaintiff’s passive negligence should hold the 
plaintiff culpable.142  A plaintiff’s passive negligence rests in his/her duty to 
avoid an unreasonable risk of harm to one’s self.143  The court went on to 
say it is fundamental in the theory of negligence for one to “exercise the 
standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would pursue under 
similar circumstances in protecting himself from harm.”144  Thus, with the 
availability and demonstrated effectiveness of seat belts, it is the plaintiff’s 
duty to avoid unreasonable harm by failing to utilize a seat belt.145 
D. NORTH DAKOTA’S CURRENT APPROACH 
North Dakota is among the minority of states that fail to recognize the 
seat belt defense within its mandatory seat belt laws.146  Instead, North 
Dakota’s seat belt laws must be read in conjunction with its comparative 
fault statutes to determine the admissibility of seat belt evidence.147  North 
Dakota Century Code section 39-21-41.4 states a person’s failure to wear a 
seat belt should not be admitted for purposes of proving negligence.148  
However, North Dakota’s comparative fault statute recognizes if the 
plaintiff is at fault, his/her damages should be reduced in proportion to such 
fault.149 
 
139. See Wemyss v. Coleman, 729 S.W.2d 174, 179 (Ky. 1987); Dunn v. Durso, 530 A.2d 
387, 397 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986); see also infra Appendix A (listing the states judicially 
adopting the approach). 
140. 530 A.2d 387 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986). 
141. Dunn, 530 A.2d at 395. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 396. 
145. Id. at 396-97. 
146. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-41.4 (2008); see also infra Appendix A (comparing other 
state statutes). 
147. See supra discussion accompanying notes 130-31. 
148. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-41.4. 
149. See id. § 32-03.2-02 (2010).  As long as the plaintiff’s fault is not as great as the 
combined fault of all other persons contributing to the injury, the plaintiff’s claim shall not be 
barred.  Id. 
          
2011] NOTE 155 
Day v. General Motors Corp.150 explained the theory of admitting seat 
belt evidence as it pertains to fault.151  Day was involved in a one-vehicle 
accident after he fell asleep at the wheel and struck a culvert, causing his 
vehicle to rollover and subsequently caused him to be ejected from the 
vehicle through the doorframe.152  Day admitted he was at fault for causing 
the accident because he fell asleep at the wheel, but contended his injuries 
would not have been sustained had General Motors not defectively 
designed the door latching system.153 
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined all fault was to be 
analogous with causal negligence.154  The court ultimately determined 
where the plaintiff’s percentage of fault is relevant, both accident-producing 
fault and injury-enhancing fault should be considered together, so as to 
reduce or defeat the plaintiff’s recovery.155  Although Day involved strict 
liability, as noted in Justice Gierke’s concurrence, the language in the 
majority opinion blurred the distinction between strict liability cases and 
common negligence cases.156 The ambiguity in the majority opinion 
implied accident-causing fault and injury-enhancing fault should be viewed 
concurrently when determining fault for purposes of reducing or defeating a 
plaintiff’s claim.157 
To further blur the distinction between strict liability cases and 
common negligence cases, a proposed jury instruction highlights the 
opinion in Day.158  It states:  “The law makes no distinction between 
accident-causing fault and injury-causing fault.  If you find fault, you must 
allocate the fault on a percentage basis between all persons legally respon-
sible for such fault . . . .”159  Although patterned jury instructions are not 
mandatory, they must follow the law of the state.160  Therefore, if the 
defense can adequately show a causal relationship between the plaintiff’s 
injuries and his/her failure to wear a seat belt, then such evidence can be 
admitted to show comparative fault.161 
 
 
150. 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984). 
151. Day, 345 N.W.2d at 351. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 358. 
155. Id. at 351, 358 
156. Id. at 358 (Gierke, J., concurring). 
157. Id. 
158. N.D.J.I. Civ. No. C-2.84 (2000). 
159. Id. 
160. City of Minot v. Rubbelke, 456 N.W.2d 511, 513 (N.D. 1990). 
161. See discussion supra Part III.D. 
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IV. IMPLEMENTING THE DOCTRINE OF AVOIDABLE 
CONSEQUENCES 
“America’s jurisdictions are both literally and figuratively all over the 
map with regard to the seat belt defense.”162  As previously discussed, the 
doctrine of avoidable consequences is the minority position states have 
taken in admitting the seat belt defense.163  Moreover, it is the most 
fractioned approach to admitting seat belt evidence.164  This part of the 
article discusses the pros and cons of the doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences.165  It also proposes an approach for adopting the doctrine and 
implementing the mitigation of damages analysis in a special verdict 
form.166 
A. ARGUMENTS FOR ADOPTION OF THE DOCTRINE 
The doctrine of avoidable consequences is the middle ground for 
admitting seat belt evidence:  evidence of the plaintiff’s seat belt nonuse is 
admissible, but it cannot wholly defeat a plaintiff’s recovery.167  There are 
two over-arching reasons the doctrine of avoidable consequences is an 
appropriate method for applying the seat belt defense.168  The first argument 
stems from the cause of the accident.169  Generally, a person’s failure to 
wear his/her seat belt does not cause the accident.170  Focusing on the cause 
of the accident creates distinction between active and passive negligence.171  
Active negligence is a negligent act that causes the initial accident, whereas 
passive negligence is a negligent act that enhances the person’s injuries.172  
However, for passive negligence to be operational, the conduct must be 
“unreasonable.”173  Generally, “only risks which are recognizable or fore-
seeable are unreasonable.  In the absence of negligent conduct which would 
alert the plaintiff to the possibility of the accident there is no foreseeable 
 
162. Bomer, supra note 109, at 424 (emphasis omitted). 
163. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
164. Bomer, supra note 109, at 70. 
165. See discussion infra Parts IV.A-B. 
166. See discussion infra Part IV.C. (specifically discussing how North Dakota should 
implement the adoption of the doctrine of avoidable consequences, but the approach could be 
implemented by any state). 
167. KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, at 458. 
168. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
169. Bomer, supra note 109, at 430. 
170. Miller, supra note 11, at 65. 
171. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 67, at 11. 
172. See id. 
173. Miller, supra note 11, at 67. 
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risk which would require the plaintiff to fasten his seat belt.”174  Therefore, 
the doctrine of avoidable consequences shifts the focus of the defense from 
what caused the accident to the extent of injuries.175  Thus, the seat belt 
defense applies to damages, not liability.176 
The second argument is conceivably the most important.177  If the seat 
belt defense is admitted to show liability under comparative fault, there is a 
possibility the plaintiff’s claim could be defeated.178  Courts in contributory 
negligence jurisdictions have consistently disallowed the defense because 
of its ability to wholly deny a plaintiff’s claim.179  The social policy for 
denying the defense in contributory negligence jurisdictions is that the 
plaintiff’s conduct of failing to wear a seat belt is not severe enough to 
potentially bar his/her recovery.180  Because the possibility for a complete 
denial to recovery is conceivable, many jurisdictions adhere to a modified 
comparative fault approach.181  Therefore, the same policy arguments that 
have unanimously defeated the defense under contributory negligence 
would again apply.182 
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE APPROACH 
There are also arguments in opposition of applying the doctrine of 
avoidable consequences to the seat belt defense.  The threshold argument 
involves the foreseeability of being in an accident.183  Under common law, 
a person has a duty to conduct himself/herself in a manner that will not 
expose him/her to unreasonable harm.184  Therefore, failing to act as a 
“reasonably prudent person” would support the conclusion that a plaintiff 
has a common law duty to wear a seat belt.185  This argument is backed by 
the now legislatively-imposed duty to wear a seat belt.186 
By incorporating the “reasonably prudent person” standard and the 
newly adopted comparative negligence theory, scholars contend the 
 
174. Id. 
175. See Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168 (N.Y. 1974). 
176. See id. 
177. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
178. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
179. Miller, supra note 11, at 70-71. 
180. Id. at 73. 
181. Id. at 74; see also discussion supra accompanying notes 35-39 (discussing how 
“modified” comparative fault functions). 
182. Miller, supra note 11, at 74. 
183. See Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 67, at 3 (conjecturing the average American will be 
injured in a motor vehicle accident in their lifetime). 
184. Dunn v. Durso, 530 A.2d 387, 396 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986). 
185. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 67, at 11-12. 
186. Bomer, supra note 109, at 428. 
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admissibility of the seat belt defense is a logical outcropping.187  “By its 
very nature, the concept of comparative negligence contemplates the 
inclusion of all relevant factors in arriving at the appropriate amount of 
damages to be recovered by each of the claimants.”188  The logical appli-
cation argument is also supported by the difficulty in bifurcating damages 
and liability.189  It would be particularly burdensome when the jury 
concludes all or most of the plaintiff’s damages are attributable to his/her 
failure to wear a seat belt.190 
However, the legal reason most often cited for the doctrine’s rejection 
is that the plain and unambiguous definition of the doctrine of avoidable 
consequences cannot be practically applied to the seat belt defense.191  The 
doctrine of avoidable consequences is a common law rule barring a 
plaintiff’s recovery for damages “for any harm that he could have avoided 
by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure after the commission of the 
tort.”192  Because a person’s failure to fasten his/her seat belt precedes the 
accident, the doctrine of avoidable consequences is inapplicable.193  
Therefore, the comparative negligence approach is the middle ground 
between the theory of contributory negligence and the mitigation of 
damages approach.194  Comparative negligence would not bar the plaintiff’s 
recovery, but contemplates the plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt before 
the accident occurs by reducing the damage recovery to the extent the 
plaintiff’s injuries were aggravated by such conduct.195 
C. PROPOSED APPROACH FOR NORTH DAKOTA 
In 2009, 17,673 traffic accidents were reported in North Dakota.196  In 
10,238 North Dakota accidents, 1054 involved motorists who were not 
wearing their seat belt.197  However, failure to wear an available seat belt 
was never cited as the cause of the accident.198  Although a person will 
 
187. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 67, at 14-15. 
188. Id. at 14. 
189. Westenberg, supra note 22, at 887. 
190. Id. 
191. Miller, supra note 11, at 70. 
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918(1) (1979) (emphasis added). 
193. Miller, supra note 11, at 70. 
194. See Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 67, at 10. 
195. Id. 
196. N.D. DEP’T OF TRANSP., N.D. 2009 CRASH SUMMARY 4 (2009), available at http:// 
www.dot.nd.gov/divisions/safety/docs/crash-summary.pdf. 
197. Id. at 55.  Data regarding seat belt usage was recorded in 10,238 of the 17,673 traffic 
accidents.  See id. 
198. Id. at 17. 
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likely be involved in a car accident at some point, the foreseeability of an 
accident should not outweigh the longstanding theory that a “defendant 
takes the plaintiff as he finds him.”199 
The doctrine of avoidable consequences is the only approach com-
bining the longstanding common law theories with the relative 
foreseeability that an accident will occur.200  The opportunity for a plaintiff 
to mitigate his/her damages prior to an accident does not ordinarily arise; 
however, the use of a seat belt provides “an unusual and ordinarily 
unavailable means” to minimize damages before an accident occurs.201  
Under the cheapest cost-avoidance theory, the doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences places the burden on the plaintiff to control whether or not he/she 
uses a seat belt, but shifts the burden for the cause of the accident to the 
tortfeasor.202  North Dakota has already adopted the doctrine of avoidable 
consequences in its application of the helmet defense.203  Implementing the 
doctrine of avoidable consequences would simply be a matter of legislative 
adoption and the creation of a patterned special verdict form.204 
The first step would be to amend North Dakota Century Code section 
39-21-41.4.205  The adoption of language from New York’s seat belt law 
would be the least restrictive means of employing the defense.206  The 
North Dakota statute currently reads, in relevant part:  “A violation for not 
wearing a safety belt under this section is not, in itself, evidence of 
negligence.”207  With the addition of language from the current New York 
law, a proposed version of the statute would read as follows:  a violation for 
not wearing a safety belt under the section would “not be admissible as 
 
199. See Westenberg, supra note 22, at 871 n.12 (explaining the maxim means, for example, 
“if the defendant is liable for disabling a high wage earner, he will pay more in damages . . . than 
if liable for injuring someone who is unemployed”). 
200. See discussion supra accompanying notes 174-75. 
201. Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168 (N.Y. 1974). 
202. Gallub, supra note 57, at 322-23.  The cheapest cost-avoidance is an economic analysis 
which places “the party best situated to avoid injuries at the lowest cost.”  SHAPO, supra note 21, 
at 8.  Based on data from 2006 to 2009, seat belt use in North Dakota is reported as “56.1% 
effective in preventing injuries and 50.7% effective in preventing fatalities.”  N.D. STATE UNIV., 
MEDICAL AND ECONOMIC COST OF NORTH DAKOTA MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES 10 (May 2010), 
available at http://www.ugpti.org/pubs/pdf/DP225.pdf. 
203. See Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W.2d 118, 123 (N.D. 1983) (permitting a plaintiff’s 
failure to wear a helmet to be considered in mitigating damages). 
204. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1229-c (Consol. 1992 & Supp. 2011); Ins. Co. of 
N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 454 (Fla. 1984) (holding the mitigation of damages 
approach with the addition of specific interrogatories to the typical verdict form was an equitable 
approach to the seat belt defense). 
205. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-41.4 (2008) (requiring the use of seat belts in North Dakota). 
206. See discussion supra Part III.B.2 (explaining New York allows evidence of seat belt 
nonuse to reduce the plaintiff’s damages up to any percent). 
207. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-41.4. 
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evidence in any civil action in a court of law in regard to the issue of 
liability but may be introduced into evidence in mitigation of damages 
provided the party introducing said evidence has pleaded such noncom-
pliance as an affirmative defense.”208 
Because of the defense’s complexity, it may be difficult for a jury to 
adequately apply or understand how to apply the mitigation of damages 
approach.209  To avoid confusion, a verdict form that clearly distinguishes 
between accident-causing fault and injury-enhancing fault should be 
utilized.210  Therefore, the following interrogatories would be an appro-
priate addition to a special verdict form where the seat belt defense is an 
affirmative defense:211 
(a)  Did defendant prove that the plaintiff failed to use reasonable 
care under the circumstances by failing to use an available and 
fully operational seat belt? 
_____Yes _____No 
If your answer to question (a) is No, you should not proceed 
further except to date and sign this verdict form and return it to the 
courtroom.  If your answer to question (a) is Yes, please answer 
question (b). 
 
(b)  Did defendant prove that plaintiff’s failure to use an available 
and fully operational seat belt produced or contributed 
substantially to producing at least a portion of the plaintiff’s 
damages? 
_____Yes _____No 
If your answer to question (b) is No, you should not proceed 
further except to date and sign this verdict form and return it to the 
courtroom.  If your answer to question (b) is Yes, please answer 
question (c). 
 
 
208. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAWS § 1229-c(8); see also Bomer, supra note 109, at 431 
(suggesting each state’s legislature should enact the mitigation of damages approach for the seat 
belt defense). 
209. See Westenberg, supra note 22, at 887 (discussing how the issues of damages and 
liability may merge for juries to consider). 
210. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 454 (Fla. 1984). 
211. The following jury instructions are more likely to be used if the defense has proven, 
through expert testimony, a causal relationship between the plaintiff’s injuries and his/her failure 
to wear a seatbelt.  See Westenberg, supra note 22, at 896-98. 
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(c)  What percentage of plaintiff’s total damages were caused by 
his (or her) failure to use an available and fully operational seat 
belt? 
_____%212 
 
The additional interrogatories should follow the traditional interroga-
tories with regard to the relative contribution of fault for causing the 
accident.213  The multi-step special verdict form allows the jury to first 
attribute each party’s fault for purposes of comparative negligence.214  
Secondly, it allows the jury to further reduce the plaintiff’s damage 
recovery by his/her failure to mitigate his/her damages.215  The two-step 
application is a “rational approach” to a complicated and real problem.216 
V. CONCLUSION 
“The seat belt defense has had a short but glamorous career.”217  
Although it has only been in effect for less than four decades, it has 
managed to stir controversy and create divisions throughout the United 
States.218  With such varying opinions, the defense has not yet received 
universal acceptance, judicially or legislatively, but the clear trend is 
towards acceptance.219  Being that North Dakota has an unsettled and 
ambiguous past with the seat belt defense,220 it is time for a change.  
Particularly, it is time North Dakota legislatively adopt the mitigation of 
damages approach for the seat belt defense.221  The doctrine of avoidable 
consequences would create an equitable balance to the seat belt defense that 
is most appropriate for North Dakota.222 
Lindsay M. Harris* 
 
212. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454. 
213. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 67, at 19. 
214. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454. 
215. Id. 
216. Bomer, supra note 109, at 431. 
217. Miller, supra note 11, at 65. 
218. See Bomer, supra note 109, at 424 (noting jurisdictions take several different 
approaches). 
219. Westenberg, supra note 22, at 904. 
220. Id. at 887 n.114. 
221. See supra discussion Part IV.C (discussing an approach to adopting the mitigation of 
damages approach to the seat belt defense). 
222. Bomer, supra note 109, at 431. 
*2012 J.D. candidate at the University of North Dakota School of Law.  A special thank you to 
my family for their constant love, support, patience, and encouragement. 
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APPENDIX A 
Alabama Inadmissible223 Britton v. Doehring, 242 So. 2d 666, 
671 (Ala. 1970) 
Alaska Mitigation of 
damages 
Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 
1199 (Alaska 1986) 
Arizona Comparative fault Law v. Superior Court, 755 P.2d 1135, 
1145 (Ariz. 1988) 
Arkansas Inadmissible ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-703 (2008) 
California Comparative fault CAL. VEH. CODE § 27315(i)  
(Deering Supp. 2011) 
Colorado Mitigation of 
damages for pain 
and suffering only 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-237(7) 
(2009) 
Connecticut Inadmissible CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-100a(3) 
(West 2006) 
Delaware Inadmissible DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4802(i) 
(2005) 
District of 
Columbia 
Inadmissible D.C. CODE § 50-1807 (LexisNexis 
2007) 
Florida Comparative fault FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.614(10)  
(West 2006) 
Georgia Inadmissible GA. CODE ANN. § 40-8-76.1(d) 
(2007 & Supp. 2010) 
Hawaii Unsettled224  
Idaho Inadmissible IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-673(8) (2008) 
Illinois Inadmissible 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-
603.1(c) (West 2008 & Supp. 2011) 
 
223. “Inadmissible” for purposes of this appendix is strictly limited to the seat belt defense’s 
admissibility for traditional comparative or contributory negligence.  In some cases, it may be 
admissible in products liability cases, better known as “crashworthiness” cases. 
224. “Unsettled” indicates the legislature has not adopted an affirmative approach and the 
defense has not been expounded upon by the judiciary. 
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Indiana Inadmissible State v. Ingram, 427 N.E.2d 444, 448  
(Ind. 1981) 
Iowa Mitigation of 
damages up to five 
percent 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445(4)  
(West 1997 & Supp. 2011) 
Kansas Inadmissible KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2504(c) 
(2001 & Supp. 2010) 
Kentucky Comparative fault Wemyss v. Coleman, 729 S.W.2d 174, 
179 
(Ky. 1987) 
Louisiana Inadmissible LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:295.1(F) 
(2002 & Supp. 2011) 
Maine Inadmissible ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29-A, § 2081(5) 
(Supp. 2010) 
Maryland Inadmissible MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 22-
412.3(h) (LexisNexis 2009) 
Massachusetts Unsettled  
Michigan Comparative fault 
up to five percent 
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 
257.710e(7) (LexisNexis 2010) 
Minnesota Inadmissible MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.685(4) 
(West Supp. 2011) 
Mississippi Inadmissible MISS. CODE ANN. § 62-2-3 (2004) 
Missouri Mitigation of 
damages up to one 
percent 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 307.178(4)  
(West 2009) 
Montana Inadmissible MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-13-106 (2009) 
Nebraska Mitigation of 
damages up to five 
percent 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-6,273 (2004) 
Nevada Inadmissible Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 708 P.2d 297, 
301 (Nev. 1985) 
New Hampshire Inadmissible Thibeault v. Campbell, 622 A.2d 212, 
214 (N.H. 1993) 
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New Jersey Comparative fault Dunn v. Durso, 530 A.2d 387, 397  
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986) 
New Mexico Inadmissible N.M. STAT. § 66-7-373  
(LexisNexis Supp. 2003) 
New York Mitigation of 
damages 
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1229-c(8)  
(Consol. 1992) 
North Carolina Inadmissible N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-135.2A(d) 
(2009) 
North Dakota Comparative fault Day v. Gen. Motors Corp., 345 
N.W.2d 349, 357 (N.D. 1984) 
Ohio Mitigation of 
damages for 
noneconomic loss 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4513.263(F) 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
Oklahoma Admissible225 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 12-420  
(West Supp. 2011) 
Oregon Mitigation of 
damages up to five 
percent 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.760  
(West Supp. 2011) 
Pennsylvania Inadmissible 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4581(e) (West 
2006) 
Rhode Island Inadmissible R.I. GEN. LAWS § 32-22-22 (2002) 
South Carolina Inadmissible S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-6540(c)  
(Supp. 2010) 
South Dakota Inadmissible S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-38-4 (2004) 
Tennessee Mitigation of 
damages 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-9-604 (2008); 
Grandstaff v. Hawks, 36 S.W.3d 482, 
492 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) 
Texas Unsettled226  
Utah Inadmissible UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-1806 
(LexisNexis 2010) 
 
225. Effective November 1, 2009, Oklahoma’s legislature changed the seat belt defense from 
not allowing evidence of seat belt use to allowing evidence of seat belt nonuse.  H.R. 1603, 52d 
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009). 
226. Texas Transportation Code section 545.413(g), which rendered evidence of seat belt 
nonuse inadmissible, was repealed in 2003.  H.R. 4, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003). 
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Vermont Inadmissible VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1259(d) 
(2007) 
Virginia Inadmissible VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1094(D) 
(2005) 
Washington Inadmissible WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
46.61.688(6) 
(West 1987) 
West Virginia Inadmissible W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-15-49(d)  
(LexisNexis 2009) 
Wisconsin Mitigation of 
damages up to 
fifteen percent 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 347.48(2m)(g)  
(West 2005 & Supp. 2010) 
Wyoming Inadmissible WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-1402(f) 
(2011) 
 
